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ABSTRACT
The process of data mining with differential privacy pro-
duces results that are affected by two types of noise: sam-
pling noise due to data collection and privacy noise that is
designed to prevent the reconstruction of sensitive informa-
tion. In this paper, we consider the problem of designing
confidence intervals for the parameters of a variety of differ-
entially private machine learning models. The algorithms
can provide confidence intervals that satisfy differential pri-
vacy (as well as the more recently proposed concentrated
differential privacy) and can be used with existing differen-
tially private mechanisms that train models using objective
perturbation and output perturbation.
1. INTRODUCTION
Differential privacy [15] is now seen as a gold standard
for protecting individual data records while releasing aggre-
gate information such as noisy count queries or parameters
of data mining models. There has been a great deal of focus
on answering queries and building models using differential
privacy but much less focus on quantifying their uncertainty.
Uncertainty estimates are needed by data users to under-
stand how much they can trust a query answer or a data
mining model.
Uncertainty comes from two sources: uncertainty in the
data and uncertainty due to privacy mechanisms. Uncer-
tainty in the data is often referred to as sampling error –
the data are a sample from a larger population (so a differ-
ent sample could yield different results). Uncertainty due
to privacy mechanisms comes from the fact that any use-
ful algorithm that satisfies differential privacy must have
randomized behavior. Both must be quantified in an uncer-
tainty estimate.
In the setting we consider, a differentially private algo-
rithm has trained a model and released its parameters. The
end user would like to obtain confidence intervals around
each parameter. These confidence intervals themselves must
satisfy differential privacy. There has been very little work
on this topic and, to the best of our knowledge, all of it has
focused on linear regression [33, 4].
On the other hand, differentially private model fitting al-
gorithms such as objective perturbation [10] and output per-
turbation [10] can train a variety of models, such as logistic
regression and SVM, and achieve state-of-the-art (or near
state-of-the-art) accuracy on many datasets. However, they
do not come with confidence intervals.
In this paper, we propose privacy-preserving algorithms
for generating confidence intervals for differentially private
models trained by the techniques of Chaudhuri et al. [10].
We provide versions of these algorithms for pure -differential
privacy, as well as the recently introduced concentrated dif-
ferential privacy (zCDP) [7].
There are three basic steps in our framework. The first
is to use either the output or objective perturbation tech-
niques [10] to provide model parameters. In the case of ob-
jective perturbation, the result satisfies both -differential
privacy as well as 
2
2
-zCDP. In the case of output pertur-
bation, the algorithms for differentially privacy and zCDP
(concentrated differential privacy) are different. In the sec-
ond step, we use Taylor’s Theorem and the Central Limit
Theorem to approximate the randomness in the model coef-
ficients that is due to both the data and the privacy mech-
anisms. This approximation relies on properties of the data
and thus necessitates a third step of estimating them using
either differential privacy or zCDP. Thus, the overall privacy
budget must be split into two phases: the budget allocated
to getting the model parameters and the budget allocated
to estimating uncertainty in the parameters.
In our experiments, we verify the accuracy of our confi-
dence intervals and observe that under pure differential pri-
vacy, the confidence intervals for models trained with objec-
tive perturbation are shorter than those for models trained
with output perturbation. However, under concentrated dif-
ferential privacy, the confidence intervals for output pertur-
bation are much smaller.
Note that the goal of this paper is not to introduce new
model fitting algorithms. The goal is to add capabilities for
quantifying uncertainty in the model coefficients.
To summarize, our contributions are the following.
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that
provides differentially private confidence intervals for mod-
els other than linear regression and our work is not limited
to any specific model – it works for any model that can
be trained using objective perturbation [10].
• The confidence intervals can be made to satisfy differ-
ent variations of differential privacy, including pure -
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differential privacy [15], zero-mean concentrated differen-
tial privacy (zCDP) [7], and approximate (, δ)-differential
privacy [14].
• We empirically validate our confidence intervals using a
variety of public datasets.
• Finally, we provide a small improvement to the original
objective perturbation model fitting technique [10] by
improving some of the constants in the algorithm.
We discuss related work in Section 2 and introduce the
preliminaries and notation in Section 3. We derive confi-
dence intervals for models trained with objective perturba-
tion in Section 4. We derive confidence intervals for models
trained with output perturbation in Section 5. We show
how to apply our algorithms to logistic regression and sup-
port vector machines in Section 6 and present experiments
in Section 7. We present conclusions in Section 8.
2. RELATED WORK
Differentially private training of data mining models has
been extensively studied, for example, in [10, 17, 26, 42,
44, 40, 5, 24, 43, 19, 38, 45, 31, 34, 35, 20, 25, 28, 37].
However, such work provides model parameters without any
uncertainty estimates (such as confidence intervals) about
the parameters. To the best of our knowledge, the only
exceptions are for linear regression [33, 4].
Chaudhuri et al. [10] studied a general class of models that
(without privacy) are trained with empirical risk minimiza-
tion. They proposed two general approaches, called objec-
tive perturbation and output perturbation for training such
models with differential privacy. Subsequent work increased
the set of models that can be trained [26, 42, 44, 43, 40].
Kifer et al. [26] extended the algorithm of [10] by removing
some differentiability requirements and allowing constraints
in model training. Yu et al. [42] solved the problem of differ-
entially private penalized logistic regression with elastic-net
regularization by extending the objective perturbation tech-
nique to any convex penalty function. Zhang et al. [44] pro-
posed the functional mechanism, which approximates mod-
els by polynomials. Subsequently, Zhang et al. [43] proposed
a general solution based on genetic algorithms and a novel
random perturbation technique called the enhanced expo-
nential mechanism. Wu et al. [40] proposed another output
perturbation technique for learning tasks with convex and
Lipschitz loss functions on a bounded domain. They relaxed
the condition of differentiable loss functions in [10]. How-
ever, we found that when both methods are applicable, the
noise added by the output perturbation technique of Wu et
al. [40] is generally larger than the noise added by the output
perturbation technique of Chaudhuri et al. [10].
High dimensional regression problems were also studied
in [5, 24]. Bassily et al. [5] proposed new algorithms for
the private convex ERM problem when the loss function
is only Lipschitz and the domain of the optimization is
bounded. They also proposed separate algorithms when the
loss function is also strongly convex. They propose algo-
rithms for both pure and approximate differential privacy.
Kasiviswanathan and Jin [24] improved the worst-case risk
bounds of Bassily et al. [5] under differential privacy with
access to full data. Moreover, with access to only the pro-
jected data and the projection matrix, they derived the ex-
cess risk bounds for generalized linear loss functions.
There has been some work on quantifying the uncertainty
for differentially private models, mostly in the form of con-
fidence intervals and hypothesis testing.
Differentially private hypothesis testing has been studied
in [36, 41, 39, 18, 30, 22, 8, 3]. Uhler et al. [36] and Yu et
al. [41] conducted differentially private independence testing
through χ2-tests with output perturbation, and adjusted the
asymptotic distribution used to compute p-values. Using in-
put perturbation, Wang et al. [39], and later independently
Gaboardi et al. [18] proposed differentially private hypoth-
esis testing for independence and goodness of fit. Kifer and
Rogers [30] later proposed new test statistics for chi-squared
testing that are more compatible with privacy noise. Kak-
izaki et al. [22] proposed the unit circle mechanism for inde-
pendence testing on 2×2 tables with known marginal sums.
Cai et al. [8] studied the sample complexity to conduct dif-
ferentially private goodness of fit test with guaranteed type
I and II errors. Later work by Acharya et al. [3] derived
the upper and lower bounds on the sample complexity for
goodness of fit and closeness testing under (, δ)-differential
privacy.
Providing diagnostics for differentially private regression
analysis was studied in [12], where Chen et al. designed
differentially private algorithms to construct residual plots
for linear regression and receiver operating characteristics
(ROC) curves for logistic regression.
Work on differentially private confidence intervals includes
[13, 33, 23]. D’Orazio et al. [13] and Karwa and Vadhan [23]
did not study models, instead they constructed differentially
private confidence intervals for a mean [23] and the difference
of two means [13]. In the context of model coefficients, Shef-
fet [33] studied (, δ)-differentially private Ordinary Least
Squares Regression (OLS) and generated confidence inter-
vals for the parameters. Barrientos et al. [4] used differential
privacy to quantify the uncertainty of the coefficients of dif-
ferentially private linear regression models. They generated
differentially private t statistics for each coefficient.
Thus the closest work related to ours is Sheffet [33] and
Barrientos et al. [4]. While their work only targets linear
regression, our work targets any models that can be trained
under the objective perturbation and output perturbation
techniques of Chaudhuri et al. [10], which include many
models such as logistic regression and SVM, but excludes
linear regression.
To obtain confidence intervals, we also need to privately
estimate second order matrices from the data. Perturb-
ing second order matrices for data are common in privacy-
preserving principal component analysis (PCA). Chaudhuri
et al. proposed to perturb the second order matrices with
the exponential mechanism to achieve differential privacy
in [11]. With the SuLQ framework [6], Blum et al. added
Gaussian noise to the second moment matrix and used it
in the PCA to protect a notion of (, δ, T )-Privacy. Jiang
et al. [21] studied the problem of publishing differentially
private second order matrices by adding proper Laplace or
Wishart noise. Dwork et al. worked on projecting the sec-
ond moment matrix of data into the low dimensional space
using the notion of approximate differential privacy in [16].
Later in [32], Sheffet also discussed three techniques to get
the second moment matrix while preserving the approxi-
mate differential privacy, with the matrices being positive-
definite.
2
Due to the structure of the matrices needed by our tech-
niques, a spherical version of the Laplace Mechanism, intro-
duced in the objective perturbation method [10] to achieve
differential privacy, or the Gaussian Mechanism [7] to achieve
zero-mean concentrated differential privacy [7], are most ap-
propriate.
3. PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATION
In this section, we introduce notation used in the paper
and then review the background of differential privacy and
its variants, empirical risk minimization, and its applications
to logistic regression and support vector machines.
Let D = {(~x1, y1), . . . , (~xn, yn)} be a set of n records.
Each record i has a d-dimensional vector ~xi of real numbers
known as a feature vector and each yi ∈ {−1, 1} is called
the target. Following [10], we require that each record is
normalized so that ||~xi||2 = 1.
3.1 Differential Privacy
Definition 1. (Differential Privacy [15]). Given an  >
0 and δ ≥ 0, a randomized mechanism M satisfies (, δ)-
differential privacy if for all pairs of databases D,D′ differ-
ing on the value of a record, and all V ⊆ range(M),
Pr(M(D) ∈ V ) ≤ e Pr(M(D′) ∈ V ) + δ.
When δ = 0, we refer to it as both -differential privacy
and pure differential privacy. When δ > 0, we refer to it as
both (, δ)-differential privacy and approximate differential
privacy. Another relaxation of differential privacy is known
as zero-mean concentrated differential privacy, or ρ-zCDP
for short.
Definition 2. (Zero-Concentrated Differential Privacy
(zCDP) [7]). A randomized mechanism M satisfies ρ-zero-
concentrated differential privacy (i.e., ρ-zCDP) if for all
pairs of databases D and D′ that differ on the value of a
single record and all α ∈ (1,∞),
Dα(M(D)||M(D′)) ≤ ρα,
where Dα(M(D)||M(D′)) is the α-Re´nyi divergence between
the distribution of M(D) and M(D′).
ρ-zCDP is weaker than pure differential privacy and stronger
than approximate differential privacy. The following results
make the relations between them precise.
Proposition 1. [7]. IfM satisfies -differential privacy,
then M satisfies (2/2)-zCDP.
Proposition 2. [7]. If M satisfies ρ-zCDP then it sat-
isfies (ρ+ 2
√
ρ log(1/δ), δ)-differential privacy.
Thus, we only focus on pure differential privacy and ρ-
zCDP in this paper. All ρ-zCDP algorithms can be con-
verted into algorithms for approximate differential privacy
using Proposition 2.
The algorithms studied in this paper rely on the concept
of L2 sensitivity:
Definition 3. (L2-Sensitivity [10, 7]). The L2-sensitivity
for a (scalar- or vector-valued) function f is
∆2(f) = maxD,D′
‖f(D)− f(D′)‖2
for all pairs of databases D,D′ ∈ domain(f) differing on the
value of at most one entry.
For example, the L2 sensitivity is used to set the variance
of the Gaussian Mechanism for ρ-zCDP.
Proposition 3. (Gaussian Mechanism [7]). Let f be a
vector-valued function (whose output is a vector of dimen-
sion d) with L2 sensitivity ∆2(f). Let σ = ∆2(f)/
√
2ρ. The
Gaussian Mechanism, which outputs f(D)+N(~0, σ2Id), sat-
isfies ρ-zCDP.
Both differential privacy and ρ-zCDP are invariant under
post-processing [15, 7]. That is, if a mechanism M satisfies
-differential privacy (resp., ρ-zCDP), and if A is any algo-
rithm whose input is the output of M, then the composite
algorithm, which first runs M on the input data and then
runs A on the result satisfies -differential privacy (resp.,
ρ-zCDP).
Another useful property of these definitions is composi-
tion, which allows the privacy parameter of a complicated
algorithm be derived from the privacy parameters of its sub-
components.
Proposition 4. (Composition [15, 7]). Let M be a ran-
domized mechanism that satisfies -differential privacy (resp.,
ρ-zCDP) and M′ be a randomized mechanism that satisfies
′-differential privacy (resp., ρ′-zCDP). Then the composite
algorithmM∗ that, on input D outputs the tuple (M(D),M(D′))
satisfies (+ ′)-differential privacy (resp., (ρ+ ρ′)-zCDP).
3.2 Empirical Risk Minimization
Empirical risk minimization is a common way of train-
ing data mining models. There is an assumption that the
dataset D = {(~x1, y1), . . . , (~xn, yn)} is independently sam-
pled from some unknown distribution F0. In this setting,
the model has a parameter vector θ and a prediction func-
tion g. Its prediction for y is g(~x, θ).
To train the model, in the setting assumed by Chaud-
huri et al. [10], one specifies a loss function in the form of
f(~x, y, θ) = f(yθT · ~x), and finds the θ that minimizes the
empirical risk:
θˆ = arg min
θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
f(~xi, yi, θ) + c‖θ‖22
]
. (1)
To satisfy differential privacy, Chaudhuri et al. [10], pro-
posed the objective perturbation technique to add noise to
the objective function and then produce minimizer of the
perturbed objective:
arg min
θ
Jn(θ,D) = arg min
θ
[
Ln(θ,D) + 1
n
βT θ
]
≡ arg min
θ
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
f(~xi, yi, θ) + c||θ||22
]
+
1
n
βT θ
)
, (2)
where β is a zero-mean random variable with density
v(β) =
1
u
e−γ‖β‖2 , (3)
where u is the normalizing constant, and γ depends on the
privacy budget and the L2-sensitivity of Ln(·).
Their proof of privacy depends on the concept of strong
convexity:
Definition 4. (Strong-Convexity). A function f(θ) over
θ ∈ Rd is said to be λ-strongly convex if for all α ∈ (0, 1), θ
and η,
f(αθ+(1−α)η) ≤ αf(θ)+(1−α)f(η)− 1
2
λα(1−α)‖θ−η‖22.
3
3.3 Logistic Regression and SVM
In the paper, we will work with the applications of logistic
regression and support vector machines (SVM)1. In logistic
regression, the goal is to predict P (y = 1 | ~x) and this is
done by modeling P (Y = 1 | ~x) = S(θ · ~x), where S is the
sigmoid function:
S(z) =
1
1 + exp (−z) =
exp (z)
1 + exp (z)
,
Logistic regression is trained in the ERM framework using
the loss function
f(~x, y, θ) = log [1 + exp (−yθ · ~x)].
In support vector machines, the prediction for y is 1 if
θ · ~x ≥ 0 and is −1 otherwise. To train it in the ERM
framework, we will use the Huberized hinge Loss [9], defined
as follows:
fHuber(~x, y, θ) =

0 if z > 1 + h
1
4h
(1 + h− z)2 if |1− z| ≤ h
1− z if z < 1− h,
where z = yθ · ~x and where h is a fixed constant [9].
4. CONFIDENCE INTERVALS FOR OBJEC-
TIVE PERTURBATION
In this section, we show how to obtain confidence inter-
vals for models trained by objective perturbation [10]. For
completeness, we present a slightly improved version of the
algorithm in Section 4.1 and then derive the confidence in-
terval algorithm in Sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4.
4.1 Objective Perturbation
The objective perturbation algorithm modifies the ERM
framework by randomly drawing a noise vector β from a
spherical version of the Laplace distribution (see Equation 3).
Then, instead of minimizing the original ERM objective
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
f(~xi, yi, θ) + c||θ||22
]
, it modifies it by adding 1
n
βT θ
and then minimizes it with respect to θ. The version of the
techniques shown in Algorithm 1 slightly differs from the
original [10] in the first line, allowing it to use less noise.
Algorithm 1: Objective Perturbation
input : Data D = {(~xi, yi)}ni=1, privacy budget , loss
function f with |f ′′(·)| ≤ t, coefficient c with
c ≥ t
2n(e−1)
1 ′ ← − log (1 + t
2nc
)
2 Sample a d-dimensional vector β with density from Equa-
tion 3 with γ = ′/2
3 θ˜ ← arg minθ
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
f(~xi, yi, θ) + c||θ||22
]
+ 1
n
βT θ
)
4 Output θ˜
Theorem 1. If the loss function f(·) is convex and dou-
bly differentiable, with |f ′(·)| ≤ 1 and |f ′′(·)| ≤ t, then Algo-
rithm 1 satisfies -differential privacy whenever all the fea-
ture vectors ~xi have ||~xi||2 ≤ 1.
1We use these two applications as examples, but our algo-
rithms are not restricted to them.
The proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix A.
In order to achieve ρ-zCDP, we use Proposition 1 to con-
clude that the algorithm satisfies 
2
2
-zCDP.
4.2 Confidence Intervals
In this section, we describe one of our main contributions
– the construction of confidence intervals for objective per-
turbation. Set Jn(θ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
f(~xi, yi, θ) + c||θ||22
]
+ 1
n
βT θ.
Let θ˜ be the privacy preserving parameters output by the
objective perturbation algorithm. Let θ0 be the non-private
solution we would get if we had infinite data (i.e. the true
parameter vector). Since the noise in Algorithm 1 is di-
vided by n, then θ0 is also the privacy-preserving solution
one would obtain with infinite data and E[∇Jn(θ0,D)] = ~0,
where the expectation is taken over the data and β (note
that β has ~0 mean).
Expanding the Taylor series of Jn around θ˜ and noting
that the gradient of Jn at θ˜ is 0 by construction (since θ˜
minimizes Jn), we have
∇Jn(θ0) ≈ ∇Jn(θ˜) +H[Jn(θ˜)](θ0 − θ˜)
= H[Jn(θ˜)](θ0 − θ˜),
where H[Jn(θ˜)] is the Hessian (matrix of second derivatives)
of Jn evaluated at θ˜.
Now, ∇Jn(θ0) is equal to 1nβT plus the average n terms
– one for each ~xi. This means that by the Central Limit
Theorem,
√
n∇Jn(θ0) can be approximated by the sum of
1√
n
βT and N(~0,Σ), where N(~0,Σ) is a zero-mean Gaussian
with covariance matrix:
Σ = E
[(
∇
(
f(~x, y, θ0) + c||θ0||22
))(
∇
(
f(~x, y, θ0) + c||θ0||22
))T ]
.
If the Hessian and covariance matrices were known, we
could combine the two approximations for ∇Jn(θ0) as fol-
lows. Let G be a random variable with distribution N(~0,Σ).
Then
√
nH[Jn(θ˜)](θ0 − θ˜) ≈ G+ β˜/
√
n,
where β˜ is a fresh random variable that follows the same
distribution as β. However, since the Hessian and the co-
variance matrix of G, are unknown, we will need to obtain
privacy preserving estimates H˜ and G˜. Substituting these
privacy-preserving estimates and performing simple algebra,
we obtain:
θ0 − θ˜ ≈ H˜[Jn(θ˜)]−1(G˜+ β˜/
√
n)/
√
n (4)
(where G˜ = N(~0, Σ˜)). We next discuss how to estimate the
Hessian and covariance matrix and how to use them with
Equation 4 to produce confidence intervals for each element
of θ0.
4.3 Computations of the Hessian and Covari-
ance Matrix
If privacy was not a concern, the Hessian would be com-
puted as:
H[Jn(θ)] =
1
n
n∑
i=1
H[f(~xi, yi, θ)] + 2cI, (5)
4
and the covariance matrix Σ would be estimated as:
Σ =E
[(
∇
(
f(~x, y, θ0) + c||θ0||22
))(
∇
(
f(~x, y, θ0) + c||θ0||22
))T ]
=E
[
(∇f(~x, y, θ0) + 2cθ0) (∇f(~x, y, θ0) + 2cθ0)T
]
=E
{
∇(f(~x, y, θ0))[∇f(~x, y, θ0)]T
}
+ 2cE[∇f(~x, y, θ0)]θT0
+ 2cθ0E[∇f(~x, y, θ0)]T + 4c2θ0θT0
=E
{
∇(f(~x, y, θ0))[∇f(~x, y, θ0)]T
}
− 4c2θ0θT0
≈ 1
n
n∑
i=1
∇f(~xi, yi, θ˜)[∇f(~xi, yi, θ˜)]T − 4c2θ˜θ˜T , (6)
where second-to-last step is obtained from the fact that
E[∇Jn(θ0)] = ~0 from which it follows that E[∇f(~x, y, θ0)] +
2cθ0 = ~0.
However, since privacy is indeed a concern, we need to
obtain estimates of the Hessian and covariance matrix using
either -differential privacy or ρ-zCDP. The same algorithm
works for both matrices and is shown in Algorithm 2.
The algorithm takes the matrix M , which is either the
Hessian (computed as in Equation 5) or the covariance ma-
trix (computed as in Equation 6). It also takes the L2 sen-
sitivity of these matrices (we show how to compute the sen-
sitivities for logistic regression and SVM in Section 6). It
uses the L2 sensitivity to determine the variance of the noise
that must be added.2 The distribution of this noise depends
on whether we want to use differential privacy or zCDP.
These resulting noisy matrices might not be symmetric
positive-semidefinite (even though the Hessian and covari-
ance matrices must have those properties). Thus we add a
postprocessing step to make the matrix symmetric and have
all eigenvalues at least 2c.
Algorithm 2: Private Symmetric Positive Definite Ma-
trix (PrivSPDMat)
input : Matrix M ∈ Rd×d, L2 sensitivity Sens(M), pri-
vacy budget φ, parameter c
1 if Requiring -differential privacy with  = φ then
2 Sample a d2-dimensional vector η with density from
Equation 3 with γ = φ
Sens(M)
3 else
// for ρ-zCDP with ρ = φ
4 Sample a noise vector η from N
(
~0, Sens(M)
2
2φ
Id
)
5 end
6 Reshape η to a d× d matrix mat (η)
7 M˜ ←M + mat (η)
8 M˜ ← (M˜ + M˜T )/2
9 Let V diag (Λ) = M˜V be the eigen-decomposition for M˜
// columns of V are orthonormal eigenvectors
10 for i← 1 to d do
11 Λ[i]← max (Λ[i], 2c)
12 end
13 M˜ ← V diag (Λ)V T
14 Output M˜
2 Since the data are spherical (i.e. ||~xi||2 = 1), it turns out
that using the L2 sensitivity is most appropriate.
Lemma 1. Algorithm 2 satisfies φ-differential privacy and
φ-zCDP.
The proof of Lemma 1 is in Appendix B.
4.4 Putting It All Together: Confidence Inter-
vals Generation
The overall algorithm is shown in Algorithm 3. It first
splits the privacy budget into 3 pieces φ1, φ2, φ3. Using pri-
vacy budget φ1, it runs the objective perturbation algorithm
to provide privacy-preserving model parameters θ˜. Privacy
budget φ2 is used to provide a privacy-preserving estimate of
the Hessian H˜ and privacy budget φ3 is used to provide a pri-
vacy preserving estimate of the covariance matrix Σ˜. Once
these quantities are obtained, it can use Equation 4. This
equation says that the distribution of θ0− θ˜ can be approxi-
mated by sampling G˜ from N(~0, Σ˜), β˜ from Equation 3 and
then plugging them into Equation 4 with H˜ instead of the
true Hessian. By obtaining many such samples z1, . . . , zm
where each zi is a d-dimensional vector (because θ0 and θ˜
are d-dimensional), for each dimension j we take an interval
(aj , bj) that covers 1 − α (e.g., 95%) of the zi[j]. Then the
estimated confidence interval for θ0[j] is (θ˜[j]+aj , θ˜[j]+bj).
Note that this sampling step is strict postprocessing – never
accesses the original data and it only uses privacy preserving
estimates from the previous steps.
Algorithm 3: Private (1 − α)-Confidence Intervals for
θ0 trained with Objective Perturbation
input : Data D = {(~xi, yi)}ni=1, privacy budgets φ1,
φ2 and φ3, parameters c, t, f used by objec-
tive perturbation (Algorithm 1), the number
of postprocessing samples m to generate, con-
fidence level α
1 θ˜ ← ObjPerturb(D, φ1, t, c) // calling Algorithm 1
2 ′ ← ′ in Algorithm 1
3 H[Jn(θ˜)]← 1n
∑n
i=1H[f(~xi, yi, θ˜)] + 2cI
4 H˜[Jn(θ˜)]← PrivSPDMat(H[Jn(θ˜)], Sens(H[Jn(θ˜)]), φ2,
c) // calling Algorithm 2
5 Σ← 1
n
∑n
i=1∇f(~xi, yi, θ˜)[∇f(~xi, yi, θ˜)]T − 4c2θ˜θ˜T
6 Σ˜← PrivSPDMat(Σ, Sens(Σ), φ3, c)
7 Generatem i.i.d. samplesGi (i = 1, . . . ,m) fromN(~0, Σ˜)
8 Generate m i.i.d samples βi (i = 1, . . . ,m) with density
from Equation 3 with γ = ′/2 (same γ parameter as
used in Algorithm 1)
9 for i← 1 to m do
10 θ(i) ← θ˜ + H˜[Jn(θ˜)]−1(Gi + 1√nβi)/
√
n
11 end
12 for j ← 1 to d do
13 (θL[j], θR[j]) ← (1 − α)-confidence interval for
θ(1)[j], . . . , θ(m)[j]
14 end
15 Output θL, θR
Theorem 2. Under the conditions of Theorem 1, Algo-
rithm 3 satisfies (φ1+φ2+φ3)-differential privacy and (φ
2
1/2+
φ2 + φ3)-zCDP.
The proof of Theorem 2 is in Appendix C.
5
5. CONFIDENCE INTERVALS FOR OUT-
PUT PERTURBATION
In this section, we provide confidence intervals for model
parameters learned with output perturbation rather than
objective perturbation. Again, we will have algorithms for
both differential privacy and zCDP. We will follow similar
steps as Section 4 to obtain the intervals.
5.1 Output Perturbation
We first review the output perturbation method of Chaud-
huri et al. [10]. Then we will explain how to obtain con-
fidence intervals for the resulting parameters in Section 5.2
(recall that they must account for noise due to the data
being a sample as well as noise due to privacy).
In output perturbation, the first step is to compute the
non-private parameters θˆ:
θˆ = arg min
θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
f(~xi, yi, θ) + c‖θ‖22
]
, (7)
and then add noise to them [10]. The L2 sensitivity of θˆ
is 1/(nc) [10] and so for -differential privacy, they release
θˆ+β, where β has the distribution from Equation 3 with pa-
rameter γ = nc. To obtain ρ-zCDP one uses the Gaussian
Mechanism instead, and samples β from the multivariate
normal distribution N
(
~0, 1
2ρ(nc)2
Id
)
. Algorithm 4 summa-
rizes their output perturbation technique.
Algorithm 4: Output Perturbation (ERMOutput)
input : Data D = {(~xi, yi)}ni=1, privacy budget φ, reg-
ularization coefficient c.
1 θˆ ← arg minθ 1n
∑n
i=1
[
f(~xi, yi, θ) + c‖θ‖22
]
2 if Requiring -differential privacy with  = φ then
3 Sample a noise vector β with density from Equa-
tion 3 with γ = ncφ
4 else
// for ρ-zCDP with ρ = φ
5 Sample a noise vector β ∼ N
(
~0, 1
2φ(nc)2
Id
)
6 end
7 θ˜ ← θˆ + β
8 Output θ˜
Theorem 3. ([10]) If the loss function f(·) is convex and
differentiable with |f ′(·)| ≤ 1, then Algorithm 4 satisfies φ-
differential privacy and φ-zCDP.
5.2 Confidence Intervals
Now we discuss our main contribution in this section, ob-
taining confidence intervals for the parameters returned by
output perturbation. Recall θ0 is the infinite sample min-
imizer to Ln(θ) =
1
n
∑n
i=1
[
f(~xi, yi, θ) + c‖θ‖22
]
(i.e. when
n→∞) while θˆ is the finite sample minimizer and θ˜ is the
privacy preserving output of Algorithm 4 that we get by
using privacy budget φ1.
We apply Taylor’s theorem around θˆ to ∇Ln(θ0):
∇Ln(θ0) ≈ ∇Ln(θˆ) +H[Ln(θˆ)](θ0 − θˆ)
= H[Ln(θˆ)](θ0 − θˆ).
As in Section 4, we define G to be the Gaussian N(~0,Σ),
and the formulas for Hessian H[Ln(θˆ)] (which is equal to
H[Jn(θˆ)]) and covariance matrix Σ are the same as Equa-
tions 5 and 6, respectively, from Section 4.2.
Similar to Section 4.2,
√
nLn(θ0) follows the N(~0,Σ) dis-
tribution, so we get
G ≈ √nH[Ln(θˆ)](θ0 − θˆ)
θ0 − θˆ ≈ H[Ln(θˆ)]−1G/
√
n
θ0 − θ˜ ≈ H[Ln(θˆ)]−1G/
√
n− β˜,
where β˜ has the same distribution as the β in Algorithm 4.
Using the same methods as in Section 4.3, we obtain dif-
ferentially private estimates for the Hessian using privacy
budget φ2 and covariance matrix using privacy budget φ3
(and define G˜ = N(~0, Σ˜)). Plugging those in, we get
θ0 − θ˜ ≈ H˜[Ln(θ˜)]−1G˜/
√
n− β˜. (8)
Note that this equation says that the difference between θ0
and the privacy preserving estimate is approximately the
same as the distribution on the right hand side, which only
depends on privacy preserving quantities (and not the orig-
inal data).
For differentially private confidence intervals, as before,
we sample many times from the distribution of G˜ and B˜ and
use the right hand side of Equation 8 to obtain approximate
samples z1, . . . , zm from the distribution of θ0 − θ˜. For each
j, we find an interval (aj , bj) that contains (1 − α) of the
zi[j]. Since θ˜ is a privacy preserving estimate, our privacy
preserving confidence interval for θ0[j] is (θ˜ + aj , θ˜ + bj).
On the other hand, if we are computing zCDP confidence
intervals, the algorithm is much more efficient. In this case
both β˜ and G˜ are multivariate Gaussians and so their sum
is the multivariate Gaussian N(~0, U) where
U =
1
2φ(nc2)
Id +
1
n
H˜[Ln(θ˜)]
−1Σ˜H˜[Ln(θ˜)]
−1,
and φ is the privacy budget used in Algorithm 4 to perturb
θˆ. Therefore we could compute the confidence intervals for
θ0 directly instead of doing Monte Carlo sampling. For each
j, we directly compute the confidence interval for θ0[j] as[
θ˜[j]− zα/2
√
Ujj , θ˜[j] + zα/2
√
Ujj
]
,
where zα/2 is the (1 − α/2)-quantile of the standard nor-
mal distribution. The complete algorithm is shown in Al-
gorithm 5. Note that once we have privacy preserving esti-
mates of θ˜, H˜, and Σ˜ using privacy budgets φ1, φ2, φ3, re-
spectively, everything else is post-processing and thus does
not affect the privacy cost.
Theorem 4. Under the same conditions as Theorem 3,
Algorithm 5 satisfies (φ1 + φ2 + φ3)-differential privacy and
(φ1 + φ2 + φ3)-zCDP.
The proof of Theorem 4 is in Appendix D.
6. APPLICATIONS TO LOGISTIC REGRES-
SION AND SVM
We now apply our confidence interval algorithms to lo-
gistic regression and support vector machines. Both models
can be learned by objective and output perturbation [10]. In
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Algorithm 5: Private (1 − α)-Confidence Intervals for
θ0 trained with Output Perturbation
input : Data D = {(~xi, yi)}ni=1, privacy budgets φ1, φ2
and φ3, regularization coefficient c, the number
of samples m, confidence level α.
1 θ˜ ← ERMOutput(D, φ1, c) // Calling Algorithm 4
2 H[Ln(θ˜)]← 1n
∑n
i=1H[f(~xi, yi, θ˜)] + 2cI
3 H˜[Ln(θ˜)] ← PrivSPDMat(H[Ln(θ˜)], Sens(H[Ln(θ˜)]),
φ2, c) // calling Algorithm 2
4 Σ← 1
n
∑n
i=1∇f(~xi, yi, θ˜)[∇f(~xi, yi, θ˜)]T − 4c2θ˜θ˜T
5 Σ˜← PrivSPDMat(Σ, Sens(Σ), φ3, c)
6 if Requiring differential privacy then
7 Generate m i.i.d. samples Gi (i = 1, . . . ,m) from
N(~0, Σ˜)
8 Generate m i.i.d samples βi (i = 1, . . . ,m) with den-
sity from Equation 3 with γ = ncφ1
9 for i← 1 to m do
10 θ(i) ← θ˜ − βi + H˜[Ln(θ˜)]−1Gi/√n
11 end
12 for j ← 1 to d do
13 (θL[j], θR[j]) ← (1 − α)-confidence interval for
θ(1)[j], . . . , θ(m)[j]
14 end
15 else
// for zCDP
16 zα/2 ← (1− α/2)-quantile of standard normal
17 U = 1
2φ1(nc)2
Id +
1
n
H˜[Ln(θ˜)]
−1Σ˜H˜[Ln(θ˜)]−1
18 for j ← 1 to d do
19 θL[j]← θ˜[j]− zα/2
√
Ujj
20 θR[j]← θ˜[j] + zα/2
√
Ujj
21 end
22 end
23 Output θL, θR
order to apply our confidence interval algorithms, we need
to compute the L2 sensitivity of the Hessian and covari-
ance matrices, as those quantities are needed to calibrate
the amount of perturbation of those matrices that we need
to protect privacy (Algorithm 2).
For logistic regression, the gradient and Hessian are well
known:
∇f(yθT~x) = −yS(−yθT~x)~x,
H[f(yθT~x)] = S(−yθT~x)S(yθT~x)~x~xT ,
where S is the sigmoid function. It is also well known that
the loss function is convex and doubly differentiable with
|f ′(z)| ≤ 1 and |f ′′(z)| ≤ 1/4.
For SVM, it is well-known that the piecewise gradient and
Hessian for the Huber loss fHuber(yθ
T~x) are:
∇fHuber(yθT~x) =

~0 if yθT~x > 1 + h
y
2h
(yθT~x− 1− h)~x if |1− yθT~x| ≤ h
−y~x if yθT~x < 1− h,
and
H[fHuber(yθ
T~x)] =
{
y2
2h
~x~xT if |1− yθT~x| ≤ h
0d×d otherwise.
Huber loss is convex and differentiable, and piecewise doubly-
differentiable, with |f ′Huber(z)| ≤ 1 and |f ′′Huber(·)| ≤ 12h [10].
Even though the second derivative does not exist at a few
isolated points, Chaudhuri et al. [10] proved that objective
and output perturbation algorithms for SVM still preserve
privacy.
We now derive the L2 sensitivity for the Hessian and the
covariance matrix for logistic regression and SVM.
Lemma 2. The L2-sensitivity of the covariance matrix Σ
(defined in Equation 6) for logistic regression is at most
2S(‖θ0‖2)2/n.
The proof of Lemma 2 is in Appendix E.
Lemma 3. The L2-sensitivity of the Hessian H[Jn(θ˜)] (de-
fined in Equation 5) for logistic regression is at most 1/(2n).
The proof of Lemma 3 is in Appendix F.
Lemma 4. The L2-sensitivity of the covariance matrix Σ
(defined in Equation 6) for SVM is at most 2/n.
The proof of Lemma 4 is in Appendix G.
Lemma 5. The L2-sensitivity of the Hessian H[Jn(θ˜)] (de-
fined in Equation 5) for SVM is at most 1/(nh).
The proof of Lemma 5 is in Appendix H.
7. EXPERIMENTS
We run experiments on several real datasets: Adult and
KDDCUP99 data sets from [27], the Banking data set [29],
the IPUMS-US [1] dataset and the IPUMS-BR [2] dataset.
Adult [27] is a dataset extracted from the 1994 Census database
and contains 30,162 records on demographic information. A
common task based on it is predicting whether annual in-
come exceeds $50K. KDDCUP99 [27] is the dataset used
for the Third International Knowledge Discovery and Data
Mining Tools Competition which contains 4,898,431 records.
It contains network traffic data simulated in a military net-
work environment and the goal is to distinguish network
attacks. Banking [29] contains 45,211 records on the direct
marketing phone calls of a Portuguese banking institution,
and is used for predicting whether the client will subscribe
a term deposit. US [1] and BR [2] are from IPUMS that
provides census and survey data from around the world in-
tegrated across time and space. Users can freely choose the
data samples and the variables to be used to create data ex-
tracts. In the paper, we use the versions from [43] where US
has 39,928 records and BR has 38,000 records. The targets
for both of them are predicting whether personal income
exceeds some thresholds.
All the datasets contain both numerical and categorical
attributes. As was done in [10, 43], following common prac-
tice for regression problems, we binarize each categorical
attribute so that an attribute with cardinality k becomes
k binary attributes. We then standardize each attribute so
its maximum attribute value becomes 1 and then normalize
each record to ensure its L2 norm is upper bounded by 1. As
for the target column, it is mapped to either -1 or 1. After
pre-processing, the dimensionality of each dataset is given
in Table 1. To experiment with the sample size and dimen-
sionality, we may extract sub-datasets from those datasets
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Table 1: Real Datasets Summary
Dataset n d
Adult 30,162 37
KDDCUP99 4,898,431 90
Banking 45,211 34
IPUMS-US 39,928 57
IPUMS-BR 38,000 53
by first randomly permuting the dataset and then taking
the first n1 samples and/or the first d1 features from it. We
also add a column of ones as the constant feature to each
final dataset, and normalize each record again to bound the
L2 norm by 1. But the dimensionality d reported with the
experimental results is the one before adding the constant
feature.
7.1 Measures
The quality of confidence intervals is evaluated using two
complementary measures, coverage percentage and length.
Coverage percentage is the fraction of times they cover the
true parameters, so a putative 95% confidence interval should
cover the true parameter at least 95% of the time. However,
an infinitely long confidence interval can also cover the true
parameter at least 95% of the time, so the goal is to eval-
uate how short the confidence intervals are. We compare
the length to a lower bound we call the variability interval
– no confidence interval can be shorter than the variability
interval. We describe how we measure coverage percentage
and compute the variability intervals next.
Coverage percentage. For each dataset D, we treat its
empirical distribution as the true distribution and the non-
private model parameters learned on the data as θ0. To sim-
ulate the effects of sampling, we create multiple “sampled”
datasets D1, . . . ,Dk by sampling with replacement from the
original dataset D. Each such dataset Di is called a boot-
strap replicate and there are k = 1, 000 of them. To estimate
coverage, for each Di we use our algorithm to compute the
privacy-preserving confidence interval
(
θ
(i)
L [j], θ
(i)
R [j]
)
for each
coordinate j of θ0. The coverage percentage for a parameter
θ0[j] is then the fraction of the privacy-preserving confidence
intervals that contain θ0[j]. The overall coverage is then the
average coverage over all parameters:∑k
i=1
∑d′
j=1 1θ(i)
L
[j]≤θ0[j]≤θ(i)R [j]
kd′
,
where 1 is the indicator function and d′ is the dimensionality
of θ0.
Variability Intervals VI. The variability interval directly
measures the actual variation in parameter estimate due to
sampling noise and due to the algorithm that estimates the
parameters (e.g., output perturbation or objective perturba-
tion). This is possible to obtain in controlled experiments.
On the other hand, confidence intervals are an estimate (not
a direct measurement) of this variability. We obtain variabil-
ity intervals as follows:
For each dataset D, we treat its empirical distribution as
the true distribution and the non-private model parameters
learned on the data as θ0. To simulate the effects of sam-
pling, we create multiple “sampled” datasets D1, . . . ,Dm
by sampling with replacement from the original dataset D.
Each such dataset Di is called a bootstrap replicate and there
are m = 10, 000 of them. This simulates variability due to
sampling. On each Di we run the privacy-preserving ERM
algorithm (either output or objective perturbation) to get
the estimate θ˜(i). The variability in these θ˜(i) is thus solely
due to sampling and privacy noise used to create the param-
eter estimates (with privacy budget φ1) – in other words, it
is not affected by the φ2 and φ3 that are used in our confi-
dence interval algorithms.
For 1 ≤ j ≤ d, let θ˜L[j] and θ˜R[j] be the α/2-quantile and
(1− α/2)-quantile of θ˜(1)[j], · · · , θ˜(m)[j], respectively. Then
the 1−α variability interval for coordinate j is (θ˜L[j], θ˜R[j]).
Clearly, any 1 − α confidence interval must therefore be
at least as long as the 1 − α variability interval and so the
quality of a confidence interval is measured as how long it
is compared to the variability interval. Thus we plot av-
erage length of confidence intervals vs. average length of
variability intervals.
Throughout our experiments, we use α = 0.05, k = 1, 000,
m = 10, 000 (recall m is the number of post-processing sam-
ples used in Algorithms 3 and 5 to estimate confidence in-
tervals). For simplicity, in the figures, we use DP for dif-
ferential privacy, zCDP for zero-concentrated differential
privacy, CI for confidence interval, VI for variability inter-
val, obj for ERM with objective perturbation, output for
ERM with output perturbation, LR for logistic regression
and SVM for support vector machines.
In our experimental results, we will report the privacy pa-
rameters  for differential privacy and ρ for zCDP. To com-
pare differentially private and zCDP algorithms on the same
plot, we set ρ = 
2
2
. This is the closest possible apples-to-
apples comparison, as any algorithm satisfying -differential
privacy satisfies ρ = 
2
2
zCDP [7].
7.2 Coverage Percentage Experiments
We first check the coverage percentage of the private con-
fidence intervals computed from our algorithms for the ap-
plications of logistic regression and SVM. With α = 0.05,
the expected coverage is about 0.95. In Tables 2 through 6,
we present the coverage percentage for the private confi-
dence intervals computed from each of our algorithms with
varying parameters. That is, we test for both differential
privacy and zCDP and we evaluate how good the intervals
are for parameters obtained through objective perturbation
and output perturbation. We can see that the coverage from
our experiments are all close to 0.95, which means the pri-
vate confidence intervals generated from our methods are
valid.
7.3 Comparison among the Private Confidence
Intervals
We test the performance of the private confidence intervals
on the applications of logistic regression and SVM. We will
compare the length of our confidence intervals to that of the
variability intervals.
We will directly compare different configurations, like in-
tervals using differential privacy vs zCDP, intervals for co-
efficients obtained through objective perturbation vs. inter-
vals obtained through output perturbation. In all of those
cases, we vary various parameters, like the sample size, di-
mensionality and privacy parameters. When we are varying
the dimensionality d, we report the length of the intervals
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Table 2: Coverage Percentage for KDDCUP99 with d = 10, 1 = 0.5, ρ1 = 0.125, 2 = 3 = 0.25, ρ2 = ρ3 = 0.03125,
c = 0.001, h = 1.0.
n
50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000 300,000 350,000 400,000 450,000
DP
obj
LR 0.9680 0.9794 0.9838 0.9880 0.9921 0.9920 0.9934 0.9943 0.9951
SVM 0.9545 0.9738 0.9760 0.9865 0.9859 0.9893 0.9906 0.9915 0.9938
output
LR 0.9695 0.9758 0.9775 0.9793 0.9825 0.9839 0.9880 0.9888 0.9894
SVM 0.9710 0.9717 0.9771 0.9780 0.9795 0.9805 0.9824 0.9850 0.9867
zCDP
obj
LR 0.9659 0.9765 0.9822 0.9870 0.9921 0.9914 0.9938 0.9948 0.9962
SVM 0.9614 0.9715 0.9791 0.9845 0.9900 0.9889 0.9917 0.9920 0.9925
output
LR 0.9915 0.9961 0.9960 0.9975 0.9975 0.9975 0.9985 0.9982 0.9984
SVM 0.9915 0.9936 0.9936 0.9948 0.9955 0.9949 0.9953 0.9953 0.9948
Table 3: Coverage Percentage for Adult with n = 30, 162, 1 = 0.5, ρ1 = 0.125, 2 = 3 = 0.25, ρ2 = ρ3 = 0.03125,
c = 0.001, h = 1.0.
d
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
DP
obj
LR 0.9575 0.9523 0.9593 0.9632 0.9642 0.9681 0.9657 0.9654 0.9708 0.9713
SVM 0.9515 0.9490 0.9630 0.9634 0.9628 0.9667 0.9655 0.9627 0.9690 0.9724
output
LR 0.9500 0.9577 0.9545 0.9598 0.9603 0.9629 0.9590 0.9559 0.9653 0.9658
SVM 0.9545 0.9550 0.9547 0.9590 0.9525 0.9610 0.9593 0.9648 0.9615 0.9605
zCDP
obj
LR 0.9645 0.9580 0.9513 0.9572 0.9592 0.9594 0.9584 0.9556 0.9577 0.9631
SVM 0.9580 0.9480 0.9473 0.9600 0.9462 0.9603 0.9594 0.9547 0.9542 0.9576
output
LR 0.9615 0.9560 0.9583 0.9646 0.9643 0.9631 0.9691 0.9693 0.9744 0.9715
SVM 0.9565 0.9510 0.9523 0.9600 0.9558 0.9541 0.9647 0.9659 0.9654 0.9650
Table 4: Coverage Percentage for Banking with n = 45, 211, d = 10, 2 = 3 = 0.25, ρ2 = ρ3 = 0.03125, c = 0.001,
h = 1.0.
1 (ρ1 = 
2
1/2)
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
DP
obj
LR 0.9568 0.9646 0.9760 0.9752 0.9805 0.9846 0.9868 0.9850
SVM 0.9743 0.9798 0.9835 0.9871 0.9898 0.9921 0.9923 0.9932
output
LR 0.9533 0.9637 0.9645 0.9728 0.9745 0.9751 0.9799 0.9821
SVM 0.9599 0.9591 0.9634 0.9657 0.9705 0.9727 0.9755 0.9792
zCDP
obj
LR 0.9546 0.9515 0.9581 0.9635 0.9643 0.9657 0.9715 0.9729
SVM 0.9550 0.9525 0.9601 0.9610 0.9577 0.9654 0.9656 0.9695
output
LR 0.9697 0.9716 0.9733 0.9770 0.9781 0.9791 0.9780 0.9803
SVM 0.9615 0.9603 0.9667 0.9697 0.9695 0.9731 0.9721 0.9754
Table 5: Coverage Percentage for US with n = 39, 928, d = 10, 1 = 0.5, ρ1 = 0.125, 3 = 0.25, ρ3 = 0.03125,
c = 0.001, h = 1.0.
2 (ρ2 = 
2
2/2)
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
DP
obj
LR 0.9751 0.9756 0.9740 0.9731 0.9715 0.9705 0.9692 0.9717 0.9690 0.9717
SVM 0.9720 0.9732 0.9725 0.9678 0.9739 0.9674 0.9643 0.9653 0.9662 0.9649
output
LR 0.9596 0.9624 0.9607 0.9613 0.9580 0.9619 0.9572 0.9593 0.9570 0.9578
SVM 0.9685 0.9641 0.9608 0.9618 0.9611 0.9567 0.9597 0.9555 0.9593 0.9574
zCDP
obj
LR 0.9546 0.9535 0.9535 0.9558 0.9495 0.9516 0.9554 0.9549 0.9551 0.9527
SVM 0.9547 0.9543 0.9497 0.9479 0.9505 0.9461 0.9487 0.9505 0.9484 0.9502
output
LR 0.9626 0.9577 0.9612 0.9626 0.9585 0.9576 0.9606 0.9595 0.9620 0.9595
SVM 0.9588 0.9546 0.9524 0.9467 0.9512 0.9490 0.9489 0.9535 0.9505 0.9499
from the first coordinate (even though we estimate all of
them). This is so that we are comparing equivalent param-
eters that have the same meaning. For example it makes no
sense to compare the interval for the first parameter when
d = 1 to the average of the first two parameters when d = 2.
When dimensionality is not being varied, we report the
average length of the intervals across all coordinates.
7.3.1 DP vs zCDP with Objective Perturbation ERM
In Figure 1, we experiment with the different privacy defi-
nitions for parameters obtained with objective perturbation.
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Table 6: Coverage Percentage for BR with n = 38, 000, d = 10, 1 = 0.5, ρ1 = 0.125, 2 = 0.25, ρ2 = 0.03125,
c = 0.001, h = 1.0.
3 (ρ3 = 
2
3/2)
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
DP
obj
LR 0.9829 0.9722 0.9682 0.9620 0.9595 0.9499 0.9602 0.9540 0.9578 0.9561
SVM 0.9815 0.9679 0.9618 0.9629 0.9635 0.9603 0.9592 0.9567 0.9617 0.9545
output
LR 0.9705 0.9663 0.9619 0.9574 0.9574 0.9593 0.9557 0.9589 0.9580 0.9619
SVM 0.9735 0.9660 0.9616 0.9638 0.9634 0.9588 0.9593 0.9607 0.9592 0.9572
zCDP
obj
LR 0.9629 0.9595 0.9618 0.9604 0.9585 0.9645 0.9568 0.9601 0.9622 0.9608
SVM 0.9554 0.9555 0.9577 0.9590 0.9575 0.9561 0.9575 0.9586 0.9555 0.9551
output
LR 0.9757 0.9735 0.9715 0.9746 0.9730 0.9720 0.9745 0.9733 0.9737 0.9722
SVM 0.9695 0.9682 0.9650 0.9677 0.9672 0.9689 0.9695 0.9673 0.9650 0.9685
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(b) Adult, LR, n = 30, 162
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(c) Adult, SVM, n = 30, 162
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Figure 1: Length of intervals for DP vs zCDP with objective perturbation ERM. Error bars correspond to
one standard deviation for CI. (a)-(c): 1 = 0.5, ρ1 = 0.125, 2 = 3 = 0.25, ρ2 = ρ3 = 0.03125; (d)-(f): n = 45, 211
for Banking, n = 38, 000 for BR, d = 10, 2 = 3 = 0.25, ρ2 = ρ3 = 0.03125; (g)-(h): n = 39, 928, d = 10, 1 = 0.5,
ρ1 = 0.125, 3 = 0.25, ρ3 = 0.03125; (i): n = 38, 000, d = 10, 1 = 0.5, ρ1 = 0.125, 2 = 0.25, ρ2 = 0.03125. Common
parameters: c = 0.001, h = 1.0.
Figure 1a shows results for varying sample size on the KD-
DCUP99 dataset. Differential privacy and zCDP performs
similarly except when n = 50, 000 where zCDP confidence
intervals are a little bit shorter in length. For the rest of the
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graphs in Figure 1 where we vary parameters other than the
sample size, zCDP outperforms differential privacy by both
average value and variance for length of confidence intervals.
This is because zCDP is a relaxation of differential privacy.
Moreover, the zCDP confidence intervals perform very well
by showing closeness in length to the variability intervals.
7.3.2 DP vs zCDP with Output Perturbation ERM
In Figure 2, we experiment with the different privacy def-
initions for parameters obtained with output perturbation.
From the figure, we see zCDP outperforms differential pri-
vacy with shorter intervals in length as well as smaller vari-
ance. The length of each confidence interval is either very
close to or only a bit longer than their corresponding vari-
ability interval. One interesting phenomenon we notice is
that the length of both intervals changes very slowly when
we vary the dimensionality for the output perturbation tech-
nique with zCDP. This is due to the smaller tails of the
Gaussian distribution. But when we get a large amount
of data (e.g., when n = 450, 000 from Figures 2a and 2b),
the data overwhelms the noise and reduces the difference
between the settings.
7.3.3 Objective vs Output Perturbation with DP
In Figure 3, we use differential privacy to compare the con-
fidence intervals that are achievable for models trained with
objective perturbation against output perturbation. The
figure shows that objective perturbation outperforms out-
put perturbation in the length of intervals but also yields
slightly larger variances in interval length. Again, when we
have enough samples (e.g., when n = 450, 000 in Figures
3a and 3b), the difference in performance due to different
perturbation techniques is almost negligible.
7.3.4 Objective vs Output Perturbation with zCDP
In Figure 4, we use zCDP and compare the confidence in-
tervals for models learned using objective perturbation and
output perturbation based ERM. Except for Figure 4c and
Figure 4d, output perturbation outperforms objective per-
turbation when we protect zCDP. We note that the con-
fidence intervals are close to the variability intervals, but
the variability intervals for output perturbation are gener-
ally much shorter. For the two exceptions, with increasing
dimensionality, the length of intervals with objective pertur-
bation grows, but the length of intervals with output per-
turbation is almost steady, and there is a cross point for
the two methods. Together with the previous findings on
d, it seems the dimensionality may add more uncertainty to
the performance of the intervals than the other parameters.
The effect of increasing sample size is the same as previous
results.
8. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we proposed algorithms for generating con-
fidence intervals of differentially private models that are
learned using objective and output perturbations. Prior
work only obtained confidence intervals for linear regres-
sion. Our experiments show that the confidence intervals
obtain the desired coverage and provide intervals that are
close to the true variability in the parameter coefficients.
Future work includes generalizing these techniques to work
with other model building algorithms.
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Adult, n = 39, 928 for US, d = 10, 2 = 3 = 0.25, ρ2 = ρ3 = 0.03125; (g)-(i): n = 38, 000 for BR, n = 45, 211 for
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Figure 3: Length of intervals for objective vs output perturbation with DP. Error bars correspond to one
standard deviation for CI. (a)-(d): 1 = 0.5, ρ1 = 0.125, 2 = 3 = 0.25, ρ2 = ρ3 = 0.03125; (e)-(f): n = 30, 162 for
Adult, n = 39, 928 for US, d = 10, 2 = 3 = 0.25, ρ2 = ρ3 = 0.03125; (g)-(i): n = 38, 000 for BR, n = 45, 211 for
Banking, d = 10, 1 = 0.5, ρ1 = 0.125, 3 = 0.25 and ρ3 = 0.03125 for (g) and (h), 2 = 0.25 and ρ2 = 0.03125 for (i).
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Figure 4: Length of intervals for objective vs output perturbation with zCDP. Error bars correspond to one
standard deviation for CI. (a)-(d): 1 = 0.5, ρ1 = 0.125, 2 = 3 = 0.25, ρ2 = ρ3 = 0.03125; (e)-(f): n = 45, 211,
d = 10, 2 = 3 = 0.25, ρ2 = ρ3 = 0.03125; (g): n = 30, 162, d = 10, 1 = 0.5, ρ1 = 0.125, 3 = 0.25, ρ3 = 0.03125; (h)-(i):
n = 30, 162 for Adult, n = 39, 928 for US, d = 10, 1 = 0.5, ρ1 = 0.125, 2 = 0.25, ρ2 = 0.03125. Common parameters:
c = 0.001, h = 1.0.
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APPENDIX
A. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Theorem 1. If the loss function f(·) is convex and dou-
bly differentiable, with |f ′(·)| ≤ 1 and |f ′′(·)| ≤ t, then Algo-
rithm 1 satisfies -differential privacy whenever all the fea-
ture vectors ~xi have ||~xi||2 ≤ 1.
Proof. The loss function f(~x, y, θ) = f(yθT~x). Because
f(·) and ‖θ‖22 are convex and differentiable, given any data
set D, the gradient of the objective function equals to 0 at
the empirical minimizer θ˜:
β = −2ncθ˜ −
n∑
i=1
yif
′(yiθ˜
T~xi)~xi.
To show -differential privacy, we compute the ratio of the
densities of θ˜ under the two neighboring data sets D and D′.
g(θ˜|D)
g(θ˜|D′) =
v(β|D)
v(β′|D′) ·
|det(J(θ˜ → β|D))|−1
| det(J(θ˜ → β′|D′))|−1 ,
where J(θ˜ → β|D) is the Jacobian matrix of the mapping
from θ˜ to β.
Given D, the (j, k)-th entry of J(θ˜ → β|D) is
∂β(j)
∂θ˜(k)
= −2nc1j=k −
n∑
i=1
y2i f
′′(yiθ˜
T~xi)~x
(j)
i ~x
(k)
i ,
where 1 is the indicator function. The Jacobian is well de-
fined since f(·) is doubly differentiable.
Given D and D′, define
A = 2ncId +
n−1∑
i=1
y2i f
′′(yiθ˜
T~xi)~xi~x
T
i ,
~u~uT = y2nf
′′(ynθ˜
T~xn)~xn~x
T
n ,
~v~vT = y2zf
′′(yz θ˜
T~xz)~xz~x
T
z .
Then, J(θ˜ → β|D) = −(A + ~u~uT ), J(θ˜ → β′|D′) = −(A +
~v~vT ).
Therefore,
|det(J(θ˜ → β|D))|−1
| det(J(θ˜ → β′|D′))|−1 =
| det(A+ ~v~vT )|
|detA+ ~u~uT |
=
|(1 + ~vTA−1~v) det(A)|
|(1 + ~uTA−1~u) det(A)|
=
|1 + ~vTA−1~v|
|1 + ~uTA−1~u| .
We can see A is a symmetric positive definite matrix and its
eigenvalues are at least 2nc. So the eigenvalues of A−1 are
at most 1
2nc
. Since y ∈ {−1, 1}, ‖~x‖2 ≤ 1 and f ′′(·) ≤ t,
|1 + ~vTA−1~v|
|1 + ~uTA−1~u| ≤
1 + ‖~vTA−1~v‖2
1
(by the triangle inequality and ~uTA−1~u ≥ 0)
≤ 1 + ‖v‖2‖A−1~v‖2 ≤ 1 + ‖v‖22‖A−1‖2
= 1 + y2zf
′′(yz θ˜
T~xz)‖~xz‖22‖A−1‖2
≤ 1 + t‖A−1‖2 ≤ 1 + t
2nc
.
Then by the definition of ′, 1 + t
2nc
= e−
′
.
Next, we bound the ratio of the densities of the noise
vectors:
β′ − β = ynf ′(ynθ˜T~xn)~xn − yzf ′(yz θ˜T~xz)~xz.
Since y ∈ {−1, 1}, ‖~x‖2 ≤ 1 and f ′(·) ≤ 1,
‖β′‖2 − ‖β‖2 ≤ ‖β′ − β‖2 ≤ 2,
so
v(β|D)
v(β′|D′) =
e−
′‖β‖2/2
e−′‖β′‖2/2
= e
′(‖β′‖2−‖β‖2)/2 ≤ e′ .
Therefore,
g(θ˜|D)
g(θ˜|D′) =
v(β|D)
v(β′|D′) ·
| det(J(θ˜ → β|D))|−1
| det(J(θ˜ → β′|D′))|−1 ≤ e
′ ·e−′ = e.
B. PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Lemma 1. Algorithm 2 satisfies φ-differential privacy and
φ-zCDP.
Proof. In Algorithm 2, only Line 8 touches the matrix
M since Lines 1 through 7 are sampling from the noise dis-
tribution and all other lines are just post-processing on the
perturbed matrix M˜ . So we just need to prove getting M˜
through Line 8 satisfies differential privacy and zCDP.
1. When protecting differential privacy:
To simplify, let vec (M) be the vector representation
of M by stacking its rows. Let M ′ be the neighbor
of M which differs in only one entry. Then given the
density of the noise in Equation 3 and the L2 sensitivity
Sens(M),
vec (M˜)|M
vec (M˜)|M ′ =
v[vec (M˜ −M)]
v[vec (M˜ −M ′)]
=
e−φ/Sens(M)·‖ vec (M˜−M)‖2
e−φ/Sens(M)·‖ vec (M˜−M′)‖2
=eφ/Sens(M)·(‖ vec (M˜−M
′)‖2−‖ vec (M˜−M′)‖2)
≤eφ.
Therefore, Line 8 satisfies φ-differential privacy.
2. When protecting zCDP:
By Proposition 3, Line 8 satisfies φ-zCDP.
The rest of the algorithm is just post-processing on the
perturbed matrix. By the post-processing property of differ-
ential privacy and zCDP, Algorithm 2 satisfies φ-differential
privacy and φ-zCDP.
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C. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Theorem 2. Under the conditions of Theorem 1, Algo-
rithm 3 satisfies (φ1+φ2+φ3)-differential privacy and (φ
2
1/2+
φ2 + φ3)-zCDP.
Proof. In Algorithm 3, there are three parts that touch
the true data.
First, the computation of the minimizer θ˜ to the objec-
tive function. Based on Theorem 1, the computation is φ1-
differentially private as long as the loss function f(·) is con-
vex and doubly differentiable with |f ′(·)| ≤ 1 and |f ′′(·)| ≤ t
for some finite t. By Proposition 1, the computation also
satisfies (φ21/2)-zCDP.
The next two parts are the computations of the Hessian
and the covariance matrix. By Lemma 1, the computation
of the Hessian satisfies φ2-differential privacy and φ2-zCDP,
and the computation of the covariance matrix satisfies φ3-
differential privacy and φ3-zCDP.
All other computations are post-processing and therefore
do not violate differential privacy or zCDP. By the composi-
tion theorem of differential privacy and zCDP, Algorithm 3
satisfies (φ1 +φ2 +φ3)-differential privacy and (φ
2
1/2 +φ2 +
φ3)-zCDP.
D. PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Theorem 4. Under the same conditions as Theorem 3,
Algorithm 5 satisfies (φ1 + φ2 + φ3)-differential privacy and
(φ1 + φ2 + φ3)-zCDP.
Proof. In Algorithm 5, there are three parts that touch
the true data.
First, the computation of the minimizer to the objective
function. By Theorem 3, this process satisfies φ1-differential
privacy and φ1-zCDP as long as the loss function f(·) is
convex and differentiable with |f ′(·)| ≤ 1.
The next two parts are the computations of the Hessian
and the covariance matrix. By Lemma 1, the computation
of the Hessian satisfies φ2-differential privacy and φ2-zCDP,
and the computation of the covariance matrix satisfies φ3-
differential privacy and φ3-zCDP.
All other computations are post-processing and therefore
do not violate differential privacy or zCDP. By the composi-
tion theorem of differential privacy and zCDP, Algorithm 5
satisfies (φ1+φ2+φ3)-differential privacy and (φ1+φ2+φ3)-
zCDP.
E. PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Lemma 2. The L2-sensitivity of the covariance matrix Σ
(defined in Equation 6) for logistic regression is at most
2S(‖θ0‖2)2/n.
Proof. We compute the L2 sensitivity for Σ as
max
D,D′
∥∥∥ vec (ΣD − ΣD′)∥∥∥
2
= max
~xn,yn,~xz ,yz
1
n
∥∥∥ vec [∇(f(~xn, yn, θ0))[∇f(~xn, yn, θ0)]T ]−
vec
[
∇(f(~xz, yz, θ0))[∇f(~xz, yz, θ0)]T
]∥∥∥
2
= max
~xn,yn,~xz ,yz
1
n
∥∥∥ [S(−ynθT0 ~xn)2 vec (~xn~xTn )−
S(−yzθT0 ~xz)2 vec (~xz~xTz )
] ∥∥∥
2
≤max
y,~x
2
n
S(−yθT0 ~x)2‖ vec (~x~xT )‖2.
Since ‖~x‖2 ≤ 1, we get ‖ vec (~x~xT )‖2 =
√∑
1≤j,k≤d x[j]
2x[k]2 =√
(
∑d
j=1 x[j]
2)2 ≤ 1. From the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
we get ‖θT~x‖2 ≤ ‖θ‖2‖~x‖2 ≤ ‖θ‖2. We know either θT~x =
‖θT~x‖2 or θT~x = −‖θT~x‖2, then −‖θ‖2 ≤ θT~x ≤ ‖θ‖2.
Based on the fact that the sigmoid function S(t) is mono-
tonically increasing in t and y ∈ {−1, 1},
max
y,~x
2
n
S(−yθT0 ~x)2‖ vec (~x~xT )‖2 ≤ 2
n
S(‖θ0‖2)2.
F. PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Lemma 3. The L2-sensitivity of the Hessian H[Jn(θ˜)] (de-
fined in Equation 5) for logistic regression is at most 1/(2n).
Proof. We compute the L2 sensitivity for H[Jn(θ˜)] as:
max
D,D′
∥∥∥ vec (H[Jn(D, θ˜)]−H[Jn(D′, θ˜)])∥∥∥
2
= max
~xn,yn~xz ,yz
1
n
∥∥∥ vec [H[f(~xn, yn, θ˜)]−H[f(~xz, yz, θ˜)]]∥∥∥
2
= max
~xn,yn~xz ,yz
1
n
∥∥∥ vec [S(−ynθ˜T~xn)S(ynθ˜T~xn)~xn~xTn]
− vec
[
S(−yz θ˜T~xz)S(yz θ˜T~xz)~xz~xTz
]∥∥∥
2
≤max
~x,y
2
n
S(−yθ˜T~x)S(yθ˜T~x)‖ vec (~x~xT )‖2
≤max
~x
2
n
S(θ˜T~x)S(−θ˜T~x).
In Appendix E, we have shown that −‖θ‖2 ≤ θT~x ≤ ‖θ‖2.
The function S(θ˜T~x)S(−θ˜T~x) achieves the maximum 1/4 at
θ˜T~x = 0. So,
max
~x
2
n
S(θ˜T~x)S(−θ˜T~x) ≤ 1
2n
.
G. PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Lemma 4. The L2-sensitivity of the covariance matrix Σ
(defined in Equation 6) for SVM is at most 2/n.
Proof. We compute the L2 sensitivity for Σ as:
max
D,D′
∥∥∥ vec (Σ′D − Σ′D′)∥∥∥
2
= max
~xn,yn,~xz ,yz
1
n
∥∥∥ vec [∇f(~xn, yn, θ0)[∇f(~xn, yn, θ0)]T ]
− vec
[
∇f(~xz, yz, θ0)[∇f(~xz, yz, θ0)]T
]∥∥∥
2
≤max
y,~x
2
n
∥∥∥ vec [∇f(~x, y, θ0)[∇f(~x, y, θ0)]T ]∥∥∥
2
.
There are three cases:
1. If yθT~x > 1 + h,
max
y,~x
2
n
∥∥∥ vec [∇f(~x, y, θ0)[∇f(~x, y, θ0)]T ]∥∥∥
2
= 0.
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2. If |1− yθT~x| ≤ h,
max
y,~x
2
n
∥∥∥ vec [∇f(~x, y, θ0)[∇f(~x, y, θ0)]T ]∥∥∥
2
= max
y,~x
2
n
[ y
2h
(yθT0 ~x− 1− h)
]2
‖ vec(~x~xT )‖2
≤max
y,~x
1
2nh2
(yθT0 ~x− 1− h)2
≤ 1
2nh2
· 4h2 since yθT0 ~x− 1 ∈ [−h, h]
=2/n.
3. If yθT~x < 1− h,
max
y,~x
2
n
∥∥∥ vec [∇f(~x, y, θ0)[∇f(~x, y, θ0)]T ]∥∥∥
2
= max
y,~x
2
n
y2‖ vec(~x~xT )‖2
≤2/n.
Therefore, in all cases,
max
y,~x
2
n
∥∥∥ vec [∇f(~x, y, θ0)[∇f(~x, y, θ0)]T ]∥∥∥
2
≤ 2/n.
H. PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Lemma 5. The L2-sensitivity of the Hessian H[Jn(θ˜)] (de-
fined in Equation 5) for SVM is at most 1/(nh).
Proof. The L2 sensitivity for H[Jn(θ˜)] can be computed
as:
max
D,D′
∥∥∥ vec{H[Jn(D, θ˜)]−H[Jn(D′, θ˜)]}∥∥∥
2
= max
~xn,yn,~xz ,yz
1
n
∥∥∥ vec{H[f(ynθ˜~xn)]−H[f(yz θ˜~xz)]}∥∥∥
2
.
There are two cases:
1. If |1− yθT~x| ≤ h,
max
~xn,yn,~xz ,yz
1
n
∥∥∥ vec{H[f(ynθ˜~xn)]−H[f(yz θ˜~xz)]}∥∥∥
2
= max
~xn,yn,~xz ,yz
1
n
∥∥∥ vec{y2n
2h
~xn~x
T
n − y
2
z
2h
~xz~x
T
z
}∥∥∥
2
≤max
~x,y
2
n
· 1
2h
‖ vec(~x~xT )‖2
≤1/(nh).
2. Otherwise,
max
~xn,yn,~xz ,yz
1
n
∥∥∥ vec{H[f(ynθ˜~xn)]−H[f(yz θ˜~xz)]}∥∥∥
2
= 0.
Therefore, in all cases,
max
~xn,yn,~xz ,yz
1
n
∥∥∥ vec{H[f(ynθ˜~xn)]−H[f(yz θ˜~xz)]}∥∥∥
2
≤ 1/(nh).
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